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NO. 464.
THE SAFETY OF AVIATION.*
By J. Sabatier.
PART 1.
The question of safety in aviation has called forth an ex-
ceptional number of articles in lzance during the past year.
Tl:e “CormnissionPermanence dlEtudes Adronautiques” (Perma-
nent Co-remissionfor Aeronautic Research), presided over by Mr.
Rateau, has long been investigating the strength of airplane
cells in flight and calculation methods for guaranteeing it.
T’ne“Commission d’Aviation de llAe’ro-(;l.ubde France” (Avia–
tion Committee of the Aero Club of France), presided over by
Mr. Soreau, has.discussed, with all the fullness they merit,
the safety-contest progxams, which the Guggenheim Fund in the
United States submitted fc~ its examination. The discussions
bore more especially on loss of speed (stalling) and on the
qualities required by the cells when the engines are stopped or
the controls are abandoned.
More recently, the llOcmflitdde Propaganda pour l?A~ronauti,quelf
(Aeronautic Propaganda C~mmittee ) hqs organized a series of”sub-
committees, both for investigating some,of the problems relating
*“Ex~en d’Ensemble des Principaux Probl&mes Concernant la S4-
curite de la Nqvi’gation Adriennejf’ “Bulletin Technique” No. 42, of
of the ‘fServiceTechnique et Industrial de l~A&ronautique,”
June 18, 1927,
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to safety in flight and also for discovering means to solvem. .
.,
1:
~
them. The efforts of this committee are devoted especially to
L
L the functioning of the engine-propeller groups, to protection
,.
against fog and to the stability of airplanes in flight.
The lfSocie’t6de Navigation Aeriennell (Aerial Navigation
Society) has undertaken an extensive technical investigation, in
which most of the questions pertaining to the safety of aviation
have been discussed. By offering its services to the engineers
who design and inspect aviation -materiel, to the pilots and rep-
resentatives of the companies using it and to the navigators and
meteorologists, this society has demonstrated the various aspects
of the problem and has enabled the envisagement of the possible
solutions.
Lastly, the technical departments of the government have
endeavored to assist all these instrumentalities by coordinating
them~ so as to avoid gaps or overlapping. n.eir laboratories,
statistics and test resul”:;shave been held at the disposition
of inquirers and have contributed to the co-mmoncause. Many
direct investigations, relating especially to static tests and
protection against fire, have yielded good results.
The object of the present treatise is to review all these
efforts and”’toexamine the -prese~ltstatus of aerial safety.
‘1 I I 1111111 1111 Illlllm
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General Remarks on the Problem of Safety
—..,,
.
...,,,.. ,
It is important to state first just what the problem of safe-
ty in aviation really is. The airplane will not find many users,
if ,its functioning
many ‘more, if this
cessive sacrifices
more generally, in
is not sufficiently reliable; nor will it find
reliability ir obtained at the expense of ex-
in speed and carrying capacity or, to speak
economy of opezation. In brief, it is not a
question of producing an absolutely safe airplane by subordinat-
i-ngall the other requisite qualities. On the contrary, it is
necessary to meet these requirements with the maximum degree of
safety permitted by
A safety device may
will not be finally
the present status of the art of aviation.
therefore be excellent in principle, but it
adopted, if it is excessive in weight, bulk,
aerodynamic resistance, or complexity.
Two examples will suffice to illustrate this idea, which is
disregarded by many inven-;.,rs. If an airplane had a great re–
serve of engine power, it l:~~uldavoid most of the stalls, which
cause a large proportion of the accidents. Sii~ilarly, if the
landing speed did not exceed 40 km (25 miles) per hour, the haz--
ards of forced landings would be considerably reduced. No tech-
nical difficulty prevents the production of ‘airplanes with super-
abundant power or ~~Jitha very low landing speed, but.the excess-
ive dead weight of the former and the insufficient cruising
speed of the latter reduce these advaiitages to almost nothing.
Moreover, it is not enough to meet the conditions imposed
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No? 464 4
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by safety and eccinomy of operation. It is also necessary te take
,,,
measures for”’avbi’di’ng’’everykind of accident, so as not simply tc
shift the danger and modify its nature, with no ultimate
safety. For example, many inventors; impressed.with the
*.
from the continued flow of gasoline into the carburetor,
of fire, have proposed devices for automatically cutting
gain in
danger
in case
off
this flow as soon as the temperature of the engine compartment
rises ever so little. Such deviros, if a,doptedwould, in many
instanoes, deprive the pilet of his only means of maneuvering
at the very moment when he is most in need of them. Such de–
vices would replace the fire hazard by that of stalling, and
generally with no increase in safety.
Lastly, the measures to be taken vary according to the type
of airplane and the use for which it is intended. Thus, para-
chutes are indispensable on military airplanes, where they have
already sa,-~edmany lives. On the other haild,their use cn com–
mercial airplanes is more q-~estionable) because the passengers
generally have neither the experience nor the presence of mind
to profit by their use, in case of need. 0: the other hand,
con~mercial aviation companies, whose personnel is stable and ex-
perienced, can profit from delicate safety devices of function-
ing or upkeep, while military formations, with a young personnel
of short term of service, would derive much less benefit from
such devices.
The above considerations demonstrate the complexity of the
(N.A.C.A..Technical iu!emorandurnNo. 464 5
problem of aerial safety. We cannot expect to solve it as cer-
...,.,,,., ,.,,,,,,
tain writers have propdsed, by &d.optingthe most effective pre-
ventive for each category of poss~.ble accidents md by installing
on one and the same airplane all the corresponding devices.
k.
Such an airplane, were it realizable, w-ouldcertainly not be
able to fly. The possible solutions are neither simple nor uni-
form. It is only by ‘athorough analysis of each type of air-
plane, of the particular service for which it is designed and
of the consequent possibilities, that we can improve them and
gradually develop their efficacy.
Statistics and Their Results
The study of the statistics of accidents form the basis of
researches relating to progress in
ble information in this connection-
“Soci&t& de Navigation A6rIenne. “*
safety. Particularly valua-
has been supplied by the
The statistics concerning
the civil aeroilautics of the different countries are known in
their entixety. This is not true, however, of accidents irnthe
military and maritime aeronauti~s of the various countries for
obvious reasons. For the latter we are therefore restricted to
incomplete data taken from official publications and parliament-
ary documents.
Nevertheless, the study of accidents in military aviation
—
*See Brunat, II, III, and IV (The Roman numerals refer to the
bibliography at the end (Part II) of this treatise.
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is of great value to civil aviation. In fact, the service condi-
tions ‘for’military aircraft are genezally severer than those for
commercial aircraft. Stunt and night flying and landing m all
kinds of fields are of constant concurrence. Accidents are there-
fore much more frequent, The technical lessons drawn from them
can; howlever, be almost always applied to commercial aviation.
From this viewpoint, military aviation constitutes a veritable
experimental laboratory for civil aviation.
It would therefore be particularly beneficial for the civil
statistics in each country to be accessible to technicians, f@r
them to be tabulated for comparison according to a uniform mod-
el and, lastly, for them all ‘tobe compiled in a single publica-
tion* It would also be desirable for this publication to ccn-
tain all the military statistics which may have been published
in each country. There could be no objection on the part of the
respective authorities, ‘cecause it would be only a repetition
of.data already kno~l.
However that may be, the results of the statistics known
in France can be analyzed as follows: During 1923-1925 there
have been three deaths in French civil aviation for about 100,000
hours of flight, which is only cne-third of what it was in 1920.
Recent mortality statistics per hours of flight, for the British,
American and French military, air services, differ but little from
*The “ComrflissionInternational de Navigation Aerienne.” at the
request of French experts, has just lai~ the foundatiofis for
such a publication.
N.A.C.A-.Technical
one another. They
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are about six ‘times as great as in civil.avia-
,., . . . . ,.—
... ,., .-
tion,. For the past five years,’ there has been a regular decrease
in the mortality rate per hours of flight, as shown by statistics,
both in France and in the United States. There has therefore been
systematic progress in safet,y,for military airplanes as well as
for coinmercial airplanes. If, instead of thenumber ‘of deaths,
we take the number of serious accidents, we find that, in the
military air services of Great Britain and of the United States,
there are five to six accidents for one death. The proportion
was the same in France from 1923 to 1925. There has been the
same decrease in the number of accidents per hour of flight as in
the number of deaths (from three to one between 1920 and 1925 in
French civil aeronautics). Here also the statistics, although
taken from.various sources, confirm the progress made.
On the other hand, military and civil statistics, compiled
in England> the United States and France, from 1923 to 1926, and
covering about 2000 cases, ascribe 50-55$%of the accidents to er-
rors in piloting. The same documents ascribe 20-25$ to engine
failures and 6-7% to the cells. Lastly, atmospheric disturbances
and miscellaneotis causes, determined or not, cause about 20% of
the accidents. Although the discrepancies in the same column are
appreciable between one.set of statistics and another, they are
small enough on the whole for the above averagesto be considered
accurate. It is reiilarkablethat the statistics for military and
civil aviation do not differ more from each other.
Lmull
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On passing from the number of accidents to the seriousness
,,, .
of their con’sequences~ we ‘find, at least” in France (for ”all
branches of aviation from 1923 to 1925), that errors in piloting
cause 54jjof the
injuries. .These
Engine troubles,
since they cause
accidents, entailing 62-63$:of the deaths and
errors are therefore relatively the ‘most serious.
on the contrary, are relatively less dangerous,
22? of the accidents but only 5X of the deaths
and 19~0of the injuries. As to the accidents (24fi)ascribable to
other causes, they represent a medium seriousness (33? killed and
18% injured). Thus it is seen that the errors in piloting are
the most serious. To reduce their number
of prime iinportance.
Errors in Piloting
is therefore a “matter
What constitutes an error in piloting? The statistics are
often not explicit enough oilthis point. A flat turn or a spiral
take-off ce~-baiillyconstit’:tes one. The case is not so clear,
however, when, for example, the pilot, feeling his engine weaken,
begins a turn, in order to avoid an obstacle which loons up in
front of hiill.Should the consequent stall be a~cribed to the
faulty functioniilg of the engine, which was the original cause,
or to an error in piloting, simply because the pilot considered
the fall less dangerous
will vary considerably,
swered.
than the collision? Tfieconclusions
according to how this questio-n is an-
.,,
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It is doubtless true, hpwever, that the accidents ascribable
ttietrorsin piloting, without previous defect in the airplane,
are very numerous. The statistics compiled in France in civil
aeronautics for 1924-1925 show, in fact, that cut of a total of
370 more or less serious accidents entailing injuries to the
personnel or materiel, 200
‘,
as follows:
Accidents due to
1! II 11
!1 t! II
II II II
are ascribable to errors in piloting,
bad landings 120;
II take-offs; 20;
navigation errors 20;
stalling 40 l
It is seen that bad landings account for nearly one–third of the
total number (370) of accidents. The lat~er are themselves due,
in most cases, to excessive landing speed and to poor judging of
the nature of the ground, of the neighboring obstacles, or of
the prevs.~.lingwind,
To what must we attr~.’butethe frequency of these errors in
piloting? Must we agree with one of our officer pilots (Cousin,
V), perhaps too modest, th~.t ~lmenare inferior to imachineslf?
Mvst we believe, “on the contrary, that airplanes should be made
easier for average men to operate? In the former case, the ed-
ucation of the pilots and navigators should be improved. In the
latter case, the quality and design of the airplane should be
improved. Obviously, aviation could not develop very far, if
only men endowed with exceptional qualities could serve as
hT.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 464 10
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pilots. It is of vital importance, therefore, to make airplanes
less difficult to-operate, and especially to diminish.the dan-
gers from the failure of the human organism, which is always
possible. Progress in this direction may render exceptional
skill on the part of the pilots less essential, but it will never
eliminate the importance,of their task. It may even be claimed
that technical improvements, by rendering it possible to build
airplanes capable of carrying several tons of passengers or
merchandise long distances, increase the responsibilities of
the pilots and render it obligatory to requireof them superior
professional. qualifications. Hence the selection, instruction
and suitable training of the navigating personnel la,rgely deter-
mine the safety and the development of a’iiation.
Education of the Navigating Personnel
The i~.avigatingperscnnel includes not only the pilots,
but also the navigators and mecn~ics, who are their natural
aids. We will therefore consider successively the improvements
to be made in the education of each of these three classes of
specialists. The task of educating pilots diffexs,according to
whether they are to be civil or military ‘pilots. The requisite
qualifications differ widely and it is probable that the differ-
ences will become more pronounced as the two branches of avia-
tion become more specialized. However, since nearly all the
present civil pilots received their training in the army or navy,
,,
1,
‘%
—N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum 1?0.+464 11
the methods employed in educating military pilots play a prepon-
‘~erant’~de”. ...,- ,,
Sometimes these methods are criticised for their special
adaptation to the physical characteristics of
‘ VII). Future pilots will doubtless
are essential for them to know, but
the technical principles underlying
standing the reasons that the pilot
be taught
they must
them. It
the pupil (Devaluez,
the things which
also be taught
is only by under-”
can appreciate the value of
the prescribed maneuvers and can acq~ire the philosophy of his
calling. If the education of the pilot is too empirical, he
runs the risk of sooner or later encountering circumstances dif-
ferirlg from those in which he has been instructed. He is then
liable to make a wrong maneuver, unless he possesses exceptioilal
skill and experience. Unfortunately, the shortness of the mil-
itary service and the high cost of the hours of flight are ob-
stacles to the attai.amentof these qualifications. In France,
the candi,:ates for the p~i:l;.iccarrierts license in 1921 had an
average of 1000 hours of flight to their credit, while the 1924
candidates did not have over 150 hours, including their school
flights (Devaluez, VII).
This situation can be remedied by appealing more to the
intelligence of the apprentice pilots and especially by teaching
them better to use the instruments of control, with which their
airplanes are provided (speedometer, inclinometer, and”turn in-
dicator) (Cousin, VI). We often hear it said that these instru-
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 464 12
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ments are more cumbersome than useful and that a good pilot can
dispens”e--withthem; that nothing can take the place of his
1!
~laerial senses Such a theory, if adopted, would.preclude all
possibility
improvement
“to maneuver
observatioil
injury, but
of improvement in piloting and of the consequent
in safety. It is true that a pilot should be able
his airplane without recourse to instruments, the
of which requires tirw and which are susceptible of
this does not signify that he should systematically
neglect their indications.
In the first place, instruments of control are absolutely
necessary for flying by night or in foggy weather. Even in or-
dinary daytime flights, it is important f~r the pilot to com-
pare the sensations or reflexes, which the airplane produces on
his organism, with the indications of the instruments. These
indications are independent of the degree of training or the
physical c’mldition of the pilot. W.ey enable him to verify and
to ‘~calihratelfcontinually his own impressions. They thus con-
stitute a means of education and of improvement of the very
first order.
The instruiients of control are ?.TOless important for help-
ing a pilot get into form again, after he has stopped flying
for along time. The qethods.of using and of interpreting their
‘indications can, in fact, be much more easily learned than the
empirical rules or the reflexes to which the present methods so
often appeal. In brief, it seems desirable to teach apprentice
N.A.C.A. Technical Meinor.and.umNo. 454 13
P~lo~s first to use the inst~uments of control and only after
--’theyhave-acquired, the-habit of doing so, to teach them how to
be able to dispense with the instruments.
For such a method”to be efficacious, it is necessary to
have instructors who thoroughly understand the principles in-
volved. This amounts to saying that it is necessary to raise
the standards both for instructors and for their pupils. We can
first seek to increase the number of candidates in both branches
(military and commercial) and thus facilitate their selection
by an active propaganda and by the institution of more or less
important advantages. The range of these measures, however,
.>
will be seriously limited. It is necessary to establish a school
where pilots may receive the theoretical instruction:they need
and where the principles of piloting con be learned. Only pilots
graduated from this school can become instructors in the schools
of commercial piloting. .Attentionhas often been called to the
importance of such a school,not only for pilots but also for
navigators which will now be needed (Devaluez, VII and VIII).
It has already been mentioned that about 10~ of the acci-
dents in French civil aviation, attributed to errors of piloting,
were due more particularly to errors of navigation (errors of
route, collisions, etc.). M@st of ,these errors, as also some of
those ascribed to otilercauses, are due to the multiplicity of
maneuvers, which the pilot must execute alone in difficult cases,
and to his fatigued condition, especially at the end of a journey,
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No? 464 . 14
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and, lastly, to his inadequate knowledge of navigation properly
~o-call’edj’espedial’lyas “kegar.ds’keeping his course when he can
not see the ground.
In order to reduce the number of accidents, it is therefore
necessary to imprQve the instruction of the pilots in the art of
navigation and, whenever “the size of the airplane permits it, to
give them the assistance of licensed navigators. The best solu-
tion, froi~this viewpoin~, is to provide all multiplace airplanes,
military and commercial, with dual control. T~epilot holds the
position of chief control, but can be immediately replaced by the
navigator or (for lack of the latter) by tilemechanic. This de-
vice, which is gradually coming into general use, is only a step
toward the solution long since
reserving to the commander the
of freeing him from all actual
operate in person only in case
the present navigator TaJoul.dbe
of the airplane. (It is irrteresting to note that the tasks as-
adopted @n ships,
general charge of
operation, andcf
of an emergency.
in line to become
which consists in
the navigation,
requiring him to
On this plan,
the future pilot
signed”to each member of the crew of Conm&nder Byrd!s transatlan.
tic airplane, corresponded quite exactly ‘tothe above.)
“It is therefore desirable to educate navigators properly so-
called md to give pilots instruction in navig,a~iorrwhen their
education is deficient in this respect. The task is urgent be–
cause the length of individual flights is constantly increasing,
thus increasing the importance and danger of errors in navigation.
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No~,,!464
The difficulties are great, however.
.,,. .. .. ..,, .-,.,..,.
many and precise means of finding his
15
When the navigator has
bearings (co-repass,radie-
goniometry, radio signals, sounders, etc.), these often make verY
great demands on his technical knowledge (F~anck, XI). Such de-
vices can be used only by specialists with a
tific education.
This leads us therefore, for navigators
sound general. scien-
even more than for
pilots, to the necessity of establishing a school where only
pupils already provided with a good scientific educatiorr.will be
admitted and where it will only be necessary for them to complete
their education by courses in the various special branches of
aerial navigation. I% brief, this school would bear the same
relation to the schools for instructors and pilots, as the schools
for deep-water captains bear to the schools for the captains of
coasting vessels.
It will be noted that the school for pilots and navigators,
although intended pri-ncipally for commercial aeronautics, is capa-
ble of rendering great service to military and even maritime avi-
ation. The latter could send probationary officers to it for in-
struction, just as it now does to the l’EcoleSup&rieure d~A6ronau-
tique.11 It will also be noted that it deals with long-dis’~ance ~~
night flights, field-observations over inhospitable regions, and
sanitaxy or governmental missions in pacified colonies, where
technical navigation methods are more and more needed.
The question of the mechanics remains to be considered, both
Ilnllmlllm 1 11 1 11 11 11 1111 mm II II I I m.,, . --II I ,m,,m.,nm, ,., ,, . I. ,,. ,, .. . , ,,,, , , . ,,.. . ,.. .. —.. —
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on the ground and on the airplane. The mechanics have a double
t~sk-.““They must reduce, by care~ul upkeep of the engines and “’
.
accessories, the considerable number of accidents “dml% to their
poor functioning. Mozeover, they must also relieve the pilot
of his cares in the surveillance of the power plant, thus enabling
him to give his whole attention to the maneuvering itself. The
professional ability of an airplane mechanic is therefore an
portsmt factor of safety, which increases With the POWer and
especially with the number of the engines.
The problems involved in the creation of a body of good
im-
me-
chanics are easier to solve, at least in Fyance, than those per-
taining to the pilot and ilavigator. They hardly exist aside from
military aviation, where the shortness of the sexvice period
is a serious obstacle to the creation and to the -maintenance
of the necessary ele-ments. Nevertheless, real efforts have been
made in France to overcome these difficulties (Ramat, XVI). Of
course, it would be foolish to suppose (as has sometimes been
claimed) that it is possible to give young ‘men,in a few months
of schooling, all the theoretical and practical. instruction. they
need but, by a combination of recruiting in industrial centers,
preparatory courses in the service and premiums favorin”glong-
term enlistments, a corps of skilled mechanics can gradually be
built up, without ~~hich an efficient air service c~not be ‘sin- .
tained.
.
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Accidents in Landing
4.. *
We’haVe just’sem hovr to improve’the professional ability of
the navigating personnel. We will now consider how the airplanes
caribe modified so
and less sezious.
ings are among the
accidents would be
as to render aviation accidents less numerous
Bad take-offs and, more especially, bad land-
most frequent causes of damages. Some of the
avoided by a better preparation of the aviation
fields and their approaches, especially by draining off all moist-
ure which softens the ground. This is particularly important
for fields used by large airplanes, because of their great weight
and long take–off distance.
Although airdromes are
ated, their approaches soon
generally quite clear when first cre-
become encumbered with obstacles
(power-transmission lines, factory chimneys, etc.), which consti-
tute real dangers. It is iiwportanttherefore to’maintain the
greatest possible aerial access tc the airdromes. Should it be
impossible or too expensive thus to protect the whole peripheral
zone of an airport, the most important approaches should, at least,
be kept clear, thus preserving veritable aerial avenues, coinpar-
able to the channels of seaports, where navigation would have the
maximum safety (Report to the ‘commission d’Etudes Pemmne:ntesll
XVII).
HOW can airplanes be improved so as to reduce the number and
gravity of landing accidents? The operation of returning to the
ground comprises two phases, each corresponding to conditions
N.A.C.A. Technical Meinoranduq No. 464 18
whicl-imust be met. In the first phase the pilot, after stopping
h=i=sengi-nejlets- the airplme glide to the ground. In the second
phase the airplane, having reached the ground, rolls to its final
stop. At the end of the first phase, it is important to touch
the ground at a reduced speed and at a small angle of incidence.
He tries therefore to proloilg the glide, but is quickly liinited
in this attempt by the need of retaining control of his maneuvers.
On the other hand, after clearing the obstacles at the edge of
the field, he must leave a sufficient length of clear field for
stopping his airplane.
The condition of being able to maneuver is the most important
and therefore controls the other aspects of the problem. From
this viewpoint, the first phase is executed with a security in
proportion to the margin between the chosen gliding speed and the
limiting speed below which the airplane ceases to be maneuverable.
But the greater the gliding speed, the greater the shock of land--
ing and the greater the danger of capsizing. On the other hand,
the landing run of an airplane is a function of its remaining
speed. The greater it is, therefore, the greater the braking
force required to reduce it,
In order to increase the landing safety, it is therefore nec-
essary:
To reduce as much as possible the limiting speed below which
the airplane loses its maneuverability;
To l-d at speed sufficiently above this limit; .
$
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To dimension adequately the landing gears and shock absorbers;
,.. . To brake the airplane during its period of rolling.
These conditions have been particularly investigated for
airplanes desigiled to land on the decks of ships. These airplanes
have special airfoils enabling them to increase their lift at low
speeds. Their control surfaces are large, so as to be effective
at the same speeds. Lastly, the ships themselves have, on their
landing decks, braking devices which enter into action as soon as
the airplane makes contact with the deck. Unforturiately, the em-
ployment of these devices involves conditions which are acceptable
only for the airplanes embarked, by reascilof their special char-
acteristics, but very difficult for ordins.~y airplanes. Hence
their use has not yet become general. Nevc~rthe]ess, it seems pos–
sible to improve the present situation in the three follcwing ways:
By equipping the wheels with brakes to s~pplernentthe action
of the tail skid (Some cons~ructors have recently utilized a combi-
nation’ of two skids, the ozdina,ry skid and a“supplemeiltary one.
The latter points forward and can be operated at will by the pilot
so as to form a plowshare and brake the air~lane very energetica-
lly);
By employing shock absorbers capable of distributing the
landing shocks better and especially
better;
By increasing the speed range.
I% has often beellreinarked that
of absorbing their energy
the airplane, being the swift-
1 1 1 m 11 11 11llmm--—.—--—— —-, -—--,. . .. .. .. .- . . . —
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est vehicle, is the o-nemost in need of brakes, though actually
-=. having the least provision in this respect. Its meaqs of arrest
‘! are, in fact, limited to the tail skid and to the resistance
‘exerted by the air on its airfoils at large angles.
,,
‘,,,
should be remedied by the use of aerodynamic brakes
chanical brakes acting in particulu on the ‘ivheels.
This fault
and of me”-
Aerodynamic
brakes would be especiall~~ effective during the first part of the
rolling, when the air speed is still high and when any prenature
braking of the wheels might incur the danger of capsizing. The
unfolding of auxiliary surfaces or the use of reversible propel-
lers would correspond to these conditions.
Wheel brakes are more easily installed (Several types are
already used in the United States) and offer, moreover, t-head-
vantage of enabling the pilot to maneuver the airplane on the
ground, without external aid, by diffcrentiatiilg the effect on
the two wheels. Lest a too sudden stop illightcapsize the airplane,
the wheel brakes should be proviC,3d with a very gradual control,
braking very slightly at first and iilcreasing toward the end of
the course. Moreover, all devices rcducin”g the ri~k of capsizing
. would facilitate the use of wheel brakes, notably the adoption
of low landing gears placed far forward with respect to the cen-
ter of gravity of the whole airplane. Several special .mti-
B* .,.,
capsizing devices have been dnvented. Unfortunately the only
l
efficacious ones are heavy, air-l-esisting and relatively complex.
Their use cannot yet be recommended.
,.
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As regards the shock absorbers, their improvement is to be
—.
desired from tlieviewpoints of both safety and comfort. Despite
the services rendered by the ‘tsa,ndows’t(rubber-cable shock absorb-
ers), which are still most generally used, they are difficult of
upkeep and relatively fragile, especially when poorly protected
from dust Landmud. The distance reserved for their extension is
generally inadequate. . Lastly, though the sandows distribute
the stresses well, th~y do not absorb them. This is done only by
the pneumatic tires. It should be possible to make liquid or gas
shock “absorbers with a long stroke, which would remedy these
faults without excessively increasing the weight.
There still remains the problem of increasing the speed range.
Although it has been the object of much research ever since the
beginning of aviation, it has never been definitely solved. Per-
haps the use of lifting propellers, of revolvin~;wings, or some-
thing of the kind, will facilitate its final solution. At pres-
ent, however, these devicep are under investigation
practical application cannot be iiimediate.
The only devices which have been the object of
and their
adequate ex-
perimeiltation.are slotted wings and wings with variable camber
and area. They’cell for the following observations. In order to
reduce the gliding speed of an airplane, we must increase its
lift or its wing area. The latter is generally effected by tel-
escoping auxiliary surfaces, which the pilot extends at the moment
of le.ndin~. thus forming a ~rolongation of the trailing edge of
-. -.
,,
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the wings. Increase in lift is effected either by the introduc-
t~=on of..sl.o.t.sin the leading or trailing edge of the wings, or by
- -,--
warping the wings, or by simultaneously lowering both ailerons.
Since the second power of the speed enters into the flight
equation, while the lift and area occur only in the first power,
it is necessary, in order to obtain any appreciable reduction in
speed, to effect a simultaneous variation of the area and lift,
or a much greater variation in either one of these factors alone.
The simultaneous variation of both area and lift is possible, but
it is imecha.nicallycomplicated and runs the risk of making the
wings either too fragile or too heavy. The variation of only one
of the two factors is much easier, but is generally less effica-
cious, due to the difficulties encountered in giving it the nec-
essary amplitude.
In order to compare the results obtained under these condi–
tions, we must define exactly what is meant by “speed range.’!
Although the maxiinum speed of an mrplane near the ground
~M
is easily determined, the same is not true of the landing speed,
which varies quite widely according to the pilot a-ridto the
neuvers he executes. Hence we cannot introduce it directly
out running the risk of obtaining results hardly coiwparable
ma-
with-
with
ene another. It is better, from this viewpoint, to introduce the
L&l
stalling speed (vm ) corresponding to a gradual reduction of the
rotational speed of the engine. This speed is derived from the
value of the speed at tileceiling by the formula Vrfl
‘ vpJ–v—”
I .. -–-.,..—-. ——.-
—. .— .—
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The actual landing speed, in some cases, will be lower than the
s~t=allingspeedj,,..but.it will vary in the same direction; Uniiei
these conditions the speed range is represented by the expression
VM- Vm
VM .“ For existing airplanes, this expression has “values gen-
e-rally included between”30 and 45~, with an average of about 40~.
. .
The use of a variable-camber device, investigated in France
in 1923,, made’ it possible to increase the speed-range r“atioof
the corresponding airplane frcm 47.5 to 52.5%, or a relatively ~
small increase of five points. The employment of a device for
simultaneously changing the wing area and camber, tested at the
same time, inade it possible to obtain, on the contrary, the very
large gain of 17 points (from 39 to 56%). This figure represents
a reductien of 26 km (1G miles) per hcur, EI.S compared with the
minimum speed of a normal airplane, The airplane itself was found
to attain a final maximum speed of 153 km (95 miles) against a
mini-mum speed of”67 km (’42niles), or a,nabsolute speed range of
about 86 km (55 miles) per hour. It would.be interesting to com-
pare these results with those obtained in other countries under
similar conditions, especially with slotted-wings. In any case,
the above figures show the possibility of appreciably improving
the speed range. The efforts already made should therefore be
continued.
P.
Of course the advantages resulting from an increased speed
range will be utilizable only when the airplane is manageable at
its minimum speed and at the corresponding landing speed. This
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amounts to saying that the areas of the control
increased to correspond to the reduction in the
,—,.. ... - .-
For a
speed just
its normal
given speed range, the airplane will
surfaces must be
minimum speedb
have a l&ding
so much greater and consequently more dangerous, as
flight speed is higher. Therefore, in order to have
the same relative safety, the speed range should be as much great-
er as the speed of the airplane is greater. Unfortunately this
condition is net realizable in the present state
order to obtain the desired safety, some writers
ply to limit the landing speed without regard to
of the art. In
h“ave–thought sim-
the effect on
the normal flight speed. It would appear difficult to accept
this view, because speed is no{ only of obvious value in its
utilization, but is also a very important factor of Sij.fety.
There are many kinds of accidents whose causes are a function
of the time. Their probability is therefore diminished if the
speed renders it possible to shorten the time required for the .
trips. Injuries to the enzine accessories, especially failure
of the lubricating system or of the piping, the fatigue of the
pilot and the difficulties due to am imperfect knowledge of the
meteorological situation, come under this ilead. On the other hand,
a high speed diminishes the relative importance of errors with
respect to the wind and the drift and makes it easier to
..
tempest-s or squalls. It also diminishes the danger from
head winds. We should not therefore seek to improve the
qualities of an airplane at”too great a sacrifice in its
avoid
strong
l’hnding’
flight
speed.
111
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We have” just reviewed the means now available “forreducing
>-. ..-the-frequency of laading-’’cci”dcdntntS:” We must also try to diminish
the seriousness of their consequences. The following are the
most important measures to be taken in accord with this viewpoint.
Padding the pilotts cockpit omd, in general, all parts of the
airplane against which the pilot or passengers are liable to be
thrown in the event of a
The elimination, on
extre-me front end of the
hard landing;
passeng~u airplanes, of all seats at the
fuselage and their rei?lacementby a shock
compartinent similar in principle to those on ships and special
railwr,y cars;
Precautions against fire on the ground, the details ’of ‘Nhich
will be considered farther on.
Stall or LOSS of Speed
Public opinion attributes a very large proportion of aviation
accidents to tile stall or loss of speed. ITevertheless, this opin-
ion is not borne out by the statistics given above for French
civil aeronautics, which ascribe to “the stall only about 10~~of
the accidents due to errors in piloting, or only 5-6< of all the
accident’s listed. This contracliction, however, is more =pparent
than real.,first because stalls ?.remore numerous in inilitary
, .
than in civil aviation. Moreover, although s’~allingis not always
the original cause of the accidents, it often contributes indi-
rectly toward increasing their seriousness. This is the case of
II —.
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an airplane which, on the failure of the engine, does not recover
and crashes to the ground. The statistics naturally ascribe the
accident to the failure of the engine, though it is really the re-
sulting stall which converts the incident into a catastrophe. ~
What then is meant by the term l!stalll~?According to some
writers, a stall is characterized by the softness and inefficacy
of the controls, but this definition is not entirely satisfac–
tory. It is obvious that an airplane will respond to its controls
less readily at a low speed than at normal speed.. However, when
its control surfaces are properly dimensioned, they will always
enable the pilot to remain master of the maneuvers down to and
including the minimum speed of sustentation or the stz.llingspeed.
In short, the controls should not limit the speed at which an
airplane can maintain flight. If, as the abovementioned opinion
would seem to imply, there ore airplm.es whose controls prove iil-
adequate under these cond.itionsj this defect should be remedied
by enlarging the control surfaces.
The phenomenon of stalling Nay be analyzed as follows (Le-
pere, XIII). While an airplane is flying, there is equilibrium
between the attraction of gravity, the propeller thrust and the
aerodynamic resultat. Any accidental circumstance, due either
to a ~~rongm~,euver o~.to some defect in the airplane, suddenly
destroys this equilibrium, leaving the resistiilg forces prepon-
derant. The speed decreases, entailing a diminution in the lift.
The relative increase in the drag is ascribable either to a reduc-
[ ‘“ ,.,, .,,. ,, ,,, ,! !,!.. .! .!.!.! , , ...- ,..-.., . ,. ,,.,... . . ....-.,,, . , -.-.-,.---.,-—,
N.A*C.A. Technical
tion of the engine
-. -. --,’- ... ,,.,-, ,
Memorandum No. 464
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propeller thrust, or
to a spiral climb which increases the retarding component of the
weight, or to a sudden turn or other equivalent imaneuver. The
pilot, wishing to avoid the loss of altitude resulting from the
decrease in lif~, increases the angle of
ting his airplane go into a glide. This
if the propeller thrust is still greater
attack instead of let-
rmneuver may succeed,
than the minimum drag
of the air]?lane. Otherwise it only aggravates the situation.
In fact, the drag inczeases faster than the lift and the retarda-
tion of the airplane is thus accentuated. The pilot then has
only one resource, nanely, to recover his speed by diviilgand
thus resume horizontal flight. If he is too near the Suound for
diving, or if for any reason he fails to do so, a crash under
the worst conditions is inevitable. The situation will become
Still YllOTe Critical if the pilot operates the ailerons in order
to flatten out his airplane Iatez .lly. This maneuver increases
the drag of the lowered wing and tends to throw the airplane
into a spin.
From the
1. That
the pilot can
2. That
withstand the
3. That
foregoing it follows:
a stall is not dangerous at an altitude such that
dive to regain speed;
.-
the airplane must, however, be strong
abnoriml stresses produced by diving;
enough to
the control surfaces must be large enough to enable
,., ,, . .,—.. .—
—,------, ,....,,.
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the pilot to retain the mastery of his airplane down to the
st<.al.ling,speed;.. - ~~ -
..-
4. The pilot must not lose time before trying to prevent -
a descent which circumstances may render i-nevitable. He must
unhesitatingly attempt the necessary maneuvers, but -must avoid
too sudden action ~n the rudder and especially on the ailerons..
How can the accomplishment of these various maneuvers be
made easier for the pilot? It has already been mentioned that a
stall is less dangerous at a high altitude, which gives the pilot
a longer distance to dive in the effort to regain~sufficient
speed. He will also have a broader zone in which to choose a
landing place if, after regaining control, he cannot maintaim
horizontal flight. From this viewpoint, airplanes with little
reserve power and a consequent low ceiling are obviously danger-
ous.
It does not ~suffice, however, for the airplane to be able to
fly high. It is also necessary for the pilot not to hesitate to
do SO, especially when fog conceals most of the landmarks, which
ordinarily help him to keep his course. This again illustrates
the importance of pilots being able to navigate by dead reckoning.
The question of the strength to give the framewcrk of arair-
plane, in order to enable it to dive and flatten out without dan-
ger of failure, will be examined farther on.. As to the efficacy
of the control surfaces, it is a function not simply of their
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areas but also of their shapes Ad their positions with respect
.- to the cell, to the fuselage, and to the propellers.
Many experiments have been tried, especially in the United
States and in England, with normal cells and with slotted wings,
\
in order to deterinine the types of ailerons giving the highest
relative flattening-out couples. It is important to continue
these experiments and to draw general conclusions from them.
It remains to consider the instruments @.d devices whose
adoption may reduce the frequency snd seriousness of stalls. It
has been remarked (Bramson, I) that the premonitory indications
of a stall are little apparent and may escape the notice even of
very cautious pilots. If a pilot is preoccupied with the func-
tioning of his engine or the following of his route, he is liable
not to consult in time the instruments which would warn him of
the danger. Any gain, of even a few seconds, in executing the
‘maneuver of recovery, is then of vital importance. It is there-
fore important for the instruments intended to be read to be
supplemented by warning signals which will automatically draw the
attention of the pilot in case of danger.
The warning may consist of a visual or audible signal or
even of a supplementary resistance to the control stick, v~hich
the pilot can readily perceive. Many such devices have been
..
proposed. A thorough investigation of their functioning is cer-
tainly worth undertaking. Independently of warning devi;es,
there have long been installed on airplanes may instruments
, I I I I , ,,, ,,11 , ,,, ,,,, ,,,, , ,,,, ,,,,., , ,,, ,,, , , , , . , ,,, , ,, , , ,,,,, , .,,, . . . . . . . . . . . . . -... —
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whose indications suffice to prevent a pilot who knows how to in-
.,
terpret t-hem,from going into -an.-involtuztarjstall. Such are tile
air-speed indicators, turn indicators and even inclinometers.
The chief objection which pilots make to the use of these in-
.
struments, is the time required to consult them, to compare the
readings of the different instruments and, lastly, to deduce the
maneuvers to be attempted. Of course the pilot, when in diffi-
culty, has much to do and can afford to lose no time. On the
other hand, multiplying the indications does not always render
them easier to interpret. With these reservations, the prejudice
of many pilots with respect to the instruments, is certainly ex-
aggerated. In particular, the methodical observation of the air-
speed indicator is susceptible of rendering very great service
in taking off and in landing. The ~ecent transatlmtic flight
of Commander Byrd is a striking example-of the advantages result–
ing from the methodical use of instruments of control. The ’air-
plane had.to be navigated for more than six consecutive hours in
a.dense fog with no external visibility. IV the opinion of the
crew, the dangersof stalling and of flying in an abnormal position
to which the atmospheric conditions exposed them, could not have
been overcome without constant observation of the instruments.
Thus far it has been assumed that the pilot has possession
,>v. T
of all his physical and intellectual powers. Otherwise, the risks
incurred would be tremendously increased. Hence all means for
lessening the fatigue of the pilot and the consequences of even
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a temporary indisposition are of very great importance. These
,...,-, ..
rneans”will now be considered.
Comfort
- Maneuverability - Stability
Obviously the fatigue of the pilot will be lessened in pro-
*
portion to the comforts of his post, namely, a large adjustable
padded chair, instru-ments easily read and conveniently arranged,
extensive views of the territory flown over, and coinpleteprotec-
tion against the violent current of air due to the s~eed of the
‘ airplane. The use of windows similar to those of airship cars
or of Lindberghts transatlantic airplane is important in this
connection. The realization of these conditions presents no
technical difficulty. It is only necessary- for the constructor
to understand their importance and ~ive them the careful atten-
tion they deserve. Much improvement can and must be made in
this respect.
‘the
his
The pilotls fatigue will likewise be less in proportion to
maneuverability and, in some degree, to the stability of
airplane. In other wmrds, the airplane must, at the same time,
be able to maintain steady flight, without appreciable exertion
of the pilot, and to alter its altitude or direction without
the application of excessive or prolonged force to the controls.,
The condition of performing evolutions without great effort pre-
sents no particular difficulty, at least for light or mediwm-
weight airplanes. It is almost always possible to give to their
I “----‘--
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control surfaces tilesuitable area and.balance”. It is also im-
..—
poyt~t to see tha$,..the respective forces required for operating
.,..,,.
the rudder, elevator and ailerons are of tiiesame ord-erof magni-
tude. It is difficult, for example, to maneuver .anairplane well,
whose rudder and elevator work hard and whose ailerons work very
easily.
Facility of evolution is more difficult to obtain for large
airplanes with more than one engine and with a large carrying
capacity, because the distribution of the mobile loads may vary
sufficiently during the flight, or from one flight to another,
to change the location of the center of gravity and the mamagea–
bility of the airplane in altitude. Iillike marmer power varia–.
. .
tions, especially if the engines are outside the central axis of
+rheairplane, affect the manageability in direction-. Tilesedis-
advantages are generally remedied.by making the vertical and hor–
izontal stabilizers adjustable during flight. This method is
entirely satisfactory when employed judiciouslj~. Many accideilts
have happened, however, because the pilot had changed the adjust–
ment of the stabilizers to meet certain excep-tional flight condi-
tions and failed to restore them to their ori~inal positions
after these conditions had disappeared, thus profoundly disturb-
ing the stability of the airplane. This further illustrates how
,-,
important it is for the aviators to have a thorough knowledge of
the principles
have succeeded
governing the mechmics of flight. Thus far we
in controlling “very powerful airplanes without
.
-.. ..——
1,’
— .—
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interiinediary
...beyond-which
already been
devices, but we will probably soon reach the limit,
servo–motors will be necessary, Such airplanes have
built, but their testing needs to be continued.
On passing from the facility of evolution to the stability .
b
in horizontal rectilinear flight, it is found that these quali–
ties are partially opposed to one another. Moreover, stability
in altitude is the most important and the most difficult to regu-
late (Grimault, XII. Cousin, V). If an airplane is too stable
in horizontal flight, its movements of recovery are difficult
and its behavior is bad in rough weather. If, on the contrary,
the stability is relatively poor, the pilot i~ustbe constantly
regulating it and it is at the mercy of any inattention or wrong
maneuver. In order to obviate these disadvantages, recourse ~lust
be had to stabilizers capable of automatically keeping the air–
plane at an altitude determined by the pilot. Such stabilizers
exist and function, ‘notwithstanding their relative.complexity*
Their investigation and use should be encouraged. Finally, sta-
bility in normal flight should not be sacrificed to maneuverabil-
ity, as is someti-mesdone. The stability should be marked, al-
though not excessive.
We still have ‘toconsider what measures can be taken to re-
duce to a minimum the danger resulting from a momentary failure
of the pilot. We have already seen the advantages in this re-
gard of a dual control, enabling the manage-ment of the airplane
to be transferred at any instant, without interruption, from one
,,
. .
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pilot to another. Many recent ~~ights
either injured”or thrown overboa~d and
.-.!‘. ,.,,.... ... .. .,-..,.1,,
able to escape death only by operating
other, confirm the desirability of the
34
in which the pilot was
where the passengers were
the controls, somehow or
dual control. It should
therefore be made obligatory on all airplanes designed to carry
more than one person.
It may happen, however, even with a dual control, that the
pilot momentarily
sumes a dangerous
if the pilot does
loses control of the airplane, which then ap-
position. A serious accident is then iwainent,
not regain.control quickly enough. It is
therefore very desirable for an airplane to be so constructed
that, when abandoned in any position of flight, it will tend to
resume its normal flight position without the aid of the con-
trols. It is desirable, moreover, for the airplane to be stable
not only in horizontal flight at nor-realpower, but also under
the various flight conditioils encountered, according to the
speed of its engines, down to antiincluding gliding flight,. Ex-
perience proves that these conditions are realizable because
there are already many airplanes capable of flying several “min-
utes with no one at the controls and of thus inodiflyingtheir
flight position without abnormal movements according to the vari-
ations in the speed of their engines (Program
..,.
Fund contest)’..
AZ1 these considerations demonstrate the
of the Guggenheim
importance .ofthe
researches regarding the stability of airplanes at various
I
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speeds. These researches require the combined application of theo-
.-—
ret-icai”’’cal~iilatiori’s,wind-tunnel experiments and flight tests.
“ It is highly desirable for the investigators to continue their
researches in this direction, since an important part of the possi-
ble progress depends on their eventual success. A contest of .
essays on this important question has just been organized by the
11Comit6francais de propaganda pour l’A6ronautique. “
In the same order of ideas, the technical descriptions,
which should furnish the users of each type of airplane with all
the necessary information, should be much illorexplicit regarding
the stability at the various engine speeds and for the various
loads. The analogous information, furnished for ships in the form
of curves or scales giving the longitudinal and transverse
straightening moments, can serve a; a model. The regulations.
now proposed by the llCommissionInternational de Navigation
Adrienne’! anticipate, moreover, the furnishing of documents of
this nature which, by obliging constructor-s and inspectors to
investigate thoroughly, for each type of airplane, the various
elements affecting its stability, will surely help to elucidate
the details of the problem. ..
(To be followed by Technical Memorandum lTo.465 containing
the translati.on,of the rest of this art,icle.)
Translation by Dwight M, Miner,
National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics.
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